A Comparison of Polish, German and Soviet Armored Forces in the September 1939 Campaign in Poland

By Witold J. Ławrynowicz

A Comparison of Polish, German and Soviet Armored Forces in the September 1939 Campaign in Poland

The September 1939 campaign in Poland was the most important campaign for Polish armed forces in the Second World War. There were numerous reasons why Poland lost the war in 1939: lack of promised intervention by the Western powers, Soviet invasion, geographical layout of the borders and also German and Soviet superiority in numbers and technical weapons. Any changes introduced by the Polish General Staff in the time of mobilization, disposition of the forces for the war, improved armament or superior leadership could extend the fighting by a few days but could not change the outcome of the September 1939 campaign. The most consequential in the whole campaign, from the military point of view, was the number of airplanes and armored vehicles. The effectiveness of the German armored forces precipitated the breaking of the Polish defenses and the opening of breaches, which were then used by the infantry. The Germans had a novel doctrine, named “Blitzkrieg”, for use by their armored divisions. Although the doctrine was untested and not fully implemented during the September 1939 campaign, the German armed forces were successful in the execution of their war plans. The success performed by the “Blitzkrieg” doctrine, combined with armored and air strength, during the subsequent 2 years produced great victories, which astonished the world.

The situation of the Red Army, the other combatant in the September campaign in Poland, was different. Based on a huge heavy industry built in the thirties, the Soviets were able to equip their army with a mass of almost 25,000 armored vehicles. Nevertheless, the army couldn’t generate a consistent doctrine of armored force use, and in 1939, the Soviets were still employing the Tukhachevsky’s 1920 battering-ram tactics of massing of soldiers, tanks and guns as the means of achieving victory on the battlefield.

German and Soviet expenditures on armament could not have been matched by Poland. The totalitarian systems in Nazi Germany and Communist Russia lent themselves to increasing armament at the expense of other aspects of economic life. Poland, which had only 19 years of independent existence, had to build heavy industry from scratch and was unable to equip its army with a sufficient number of modern weaponry.

Poland

Looking at Polish armored vehicles it must be noticed that most of them were of a Carden-Lloyd type and were thinly armored and usually armed with only one machine gun. These were the TK3, TKS and TKF tankettes, which were the most numerous group among Polish armored vehicles. These tankettes were originally expected to perform reconnaissance duties; in reality they had to fight just like armored vehicles performing all kinds of functions. Another large group of Polish armored vehicles was obsolete (Renault FT 17, armored trains and armored cars wz. 29 and wz. 34). Light tanks (7-TP, Renault R 35 and Vickers E) employed by the Polish army were modern and carried an antitank gun, but only 17% of the Polish armored forces consisted of them. Unfortunately even that small group was dispersed and some of them did not enter combat during the September 1939 campaign.

Before the war, Poland adopted a French doctrine for the use of armored forces, which regarded tanks as a support weapon for the infantry. In September 1939 it was already an outdated doctrine, but under the circumstances, any other doctrine probably would have been impossible to implement. Poland had only two mechanized brigades and three battalions of light tanks. Light tanks most likely would be more effective within a mechanized formation than as battalions used for infantry support. Poland mobilized 698 armored vehicles, but a total of 755 were used in the regular-armed force units. There were also 10 armored trains and an unspecified number of tanks from depots and reserve units that were used in fighting. It is safe to say that all armored vehicles found in Poland in 1939 were used in fighting, even if just for brief periods of time.

Table 1
Number of tanks (tankettes) in Polish armored units before the September 1939 mobilization

* the full production of TKF tankettes was 18 vehicles, while only 13 were mobilized by the 2 armored battalion
** add 100 armored cars Ursus wz. 29 (13) and wz. 34 (approximately 90) and 5 armored trains in each division. These numbers define the total number of armored fighting vehicles in Poland
*** including 22 Vickers jw and 16 Vickers dw tanks
PP – armored train
jw – one turret
dw – two turrets

Table 2
Numbers and types of units mobilized by armored battalions

* companies of Renault FT tanks
** company of reconnaissance tanks TKF
*** company of Vickers light tanks
& two platoons of TK3 and TKS reconnaissance tanks
$ improvised company of light tanks, commander Capt. S. Grabczewski, seven 7-TP light tanks
$$ half company of light tanks, six Renault R-35 tanks (or three Renault R-35 and three Hotchkiss H-35 tanks)
$$$ company of TK3 and TKS reconnaissance tanks, commander Capt. A. Brazuk, eleven tanks
@ company of Vickers light tanks, commander Capt. F. Michalkowski, eleven tanks

Germany

Germany had been working on its armored forces since the early twenties. After renouncing the Treaty of Versailles in 1935, the speed of the formation of armored units was accelerated. The new doctrine of “Blitzkrieg” was slowly evolving in the minds of young German officers of the armored corps. The new doctrine was never implemented in its entire form during the September 1939 campaign, due to the opposition of the old generation of general rank officers who were prone to a conservative approach to the organization of army units. Nevertheless, until September 1939, some six regular and one improvised armored division were formed. Against the spirit of the “Blitzkrieg” doctrine, the German army also formed four light divisions and two independent tank battalions. This caused a dispersion of tanks in units of lower quality than armored divisions. This large armored force was dispersed between different field armies, but was able to puncture the Polish front line on numerous occasions. The strength of the German armored forces was based more on the novelty of the doctrine and quality of the troops than on the quality of their equipment. Pz Kpfw I armed only with twin machine guns amounted to 36% of the total German armored force. Only 17% of German tanks were armed with a cannon of a caliber higher then 20 mm. Germany mobilized 2692 tanks for the campaign in Poland which made up 87% of their total armored force. An additional 408 tanks were left in reserve units.

Table 3
German armored units mobilized for the war in September 1939

* The fourth companies of each tank battalion remained in the barracks as reserve units. These units consisted of: Pz Kpfw I 260, Pz Kpfw II 67, Pz Kpfw III 11, Pz Kpfw IV 11, Pz 35(t) 34, Pz 38(t) 5, Pz Bef 20. A total of 408 tanks

The Soviet Union

The Soviet Union began tank production in 1932, based upon recently built heavy industry. Until 1939, the Red Army received nearly 25,000 tanks, something no politician or army officer in Europe could believe. Preparations for war in the Soviet Union were done at the expense of other branches of economic life. In September 1939, the Red Army had four armored corps, fifty tank brigades, four armored car brigades, twenty-six tank regiments in cavalry divisions, eleven tank regiments in armored schools and an unspecified number of tank companies in infantry divisions. Tanks in the Red Army were used only in support of infantry; there were no armored divisions and tanks were not expected to operate independently of the infantry. Inside the armored corps, there were problems with the cohesion of units. Numerous reorganizations led to confusion and the lack of proper training of the troops. Equally destructive to the value of the armored force were Stalin’s purges, during which many officers were shot. The Soviet armored forces had numerous problems with communication, field repair shops and a general lack of order. These weaknesses were masked during the September 1939 campaign by the huge superiority in numbers. The total number of tanks engaged in Poland was close to 5000, making up approximately 20% of the Soviet armored forces.

Table 4
Number of armored vehicles in Red Army units engaged in operations against Poland in September 1939

Battle Losses

Each side of the conflict lost a large number of armored vehicles during the September 1939 campaign. Poland lost its entire armored force due to destruction, capture, internship or mechanical breakdowns. Germany lost a total of 674 tanks, of which 236 were irretrievable losses. The Wehrmacht regarded as irretrievable only tanks, which were burned out or hit by a large caliber gun. Most tanks damaged by antitank guns were eventually repaired. The Soviet Union lost 429 tanks due to mechanical failures and another 42 in fighting. These numbers indicate poor mechanical condition of Soviet tanks at the beginning of the war. It should be noticed that the total number of tanks lost in the September 1939 campaign in Poland by Germany and the Soviet Union is approximately equal to the number of tanks lost by Polish armored forces. However, most German and Soviet tanks could be recovered after the conclusion of the campaign.

Table 5
Number of armored fighting vehicles lost during the September 1939 campaign

The data presented above shows the enormous superiority of the invading forces used against Poland during the September 1939 campaign. The thousands of tanks engaged on the battlefield caused the breaking of Polish defenses and encircling of the slow marching Polish infantry. The speed of armored units prevented the Polish General Staff from establishing a continuous front by outflanking any prepared defenses. Glancing at statistics, one Polish tankette, usually armed with a machine gun, had to engage, on average, 10 enemy tanks.

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